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WHEN DOES A DEBTOR HAVE RIGHTS IN
THE COLLATERAL UNDER ARTICLE 9 OF
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE?
RALPH C. ANZIWNO*
INTRODUCTION
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, applies to any
transaction (regardless of its form) that is intended to create a
security interest 2 in personal property or fixtures.' The creation
of a security interest is specifically governed by section 9-203.1
The Code lists three requirements for an enforceable security
interest: (a) an agreement 5 creating the security interest as
evidenced either by the secured party' possessing the collateral,
or by the debtor signing a security agreement' describing the
* Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. B.S. Bowling
Green University, 1969; J.D. Case Western Reserve University, 1971.
1. All references in this article are to the 1972 version of the Uniform Commercial
Code. The article, however, has equal application to the earlier versions since the
phrase "the debtor has rights in the collateral" is a statutory requirement of equal
mystery in all the versions of the Code.
2. U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
3. U.C.C. § 9-102.
4. U.C.C. § 9-203. That section provides as follows:
(1) Subject to the provisions of Section 4-208 on the security interest of a
collecting bank and Section 9-113 on a security interest arising under the Article
on Sales, a security interest is not enforceable against the debtor or third parties
with respect to the collateral and does not attach unless
(a) the collateral is in the possession of the secured party pursuant to
agreement, or the debtor has signed a security agreement which contains
a description of the collateral and in addition, when the security interest
covers crops growing or to be grown or timber to be cut, a description of
the land concerned; and
(b) value has been given; and
(c) the debtor has rights in the collateral (emphasis added).
The corresponding sections under the 1962 version of the Code are U.C.C. §§ 9-203
and 9-204.
5. U.C.C. § 1-201(3).
6. U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(m). That section defines the term "secured party" as follows:
"Secured party" means a lender, seller or other person in whose favor there is a
security interest, including a person to whom accounts or chattel paper have
been sold. When the holders of obligations issued under an indenture of trust,
equipment trust agreement or the like are represented by a trustee or other
person, the representative is the secured party.
7. U.C.C. § 9-105(1). The Code defines a "security agreement" as any agreement
which creates or provides for a security interest.
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collateral; (b) value' must be given; and (c) the debtor must
have "rights9 in the collateral.""0 There is no specific order in
which these requirements must be met," but it is essential that
they all be fulfilled. 2 Once the requirements have been satis-
fied, the security interest is deemed to attach"3 to the collateral,
thereby becoming enforceable'4 against the debtor. After at-
tachment, the security interest may be made enforceable
against third parties by perfection.'5
The creation of an enforceable security interest is clearly
the foundation upon which a secured party must build his Arti-
cle 9 protection. This article is focused on one of the building
blocks for the creation of an enforceable security interest - the
requirement that the debtor have rights in the collateral."6 The
8. U.C.C. § 1-201(44).
9. The term "rights" is defined as including remedies in U.C.C. § 1-201(36). The
definition has no application to the phrase in Article 9.
10. The phrase "rights in the collateral" appears six times in Article 9: U.C.C. §§
9-105(1)(d); 9-107(b); 9-108; 9-203(1)(c); 9-204(2); 9-311.
For two cases indicating the need to have rights in the collateral, see Tinsman v.
Moline Beneficial Fin. Co., 531 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1976); McCrackin v. Hayes, 118 Ga.
App. 267, 163 S.E.2d 246 (1968).
11. See, e.g., In re United Thrift Stores, Inc., 363 F.2d 11 (3rd Cir. 1966); In re
Allen, 395 F. Supp. l,50 (E.D. fI1. 1975); In re Laue, 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 420 (D. R.I.
1970); Enterprises NOW, Inc. v. Citizens & S. Dev. Corp., 135 Ga. App. 602, 218
S.E.2d 309 (1975).
12. See, e.g., Branch v. Steph, 389 F.2d 233 (10th Cir. 1968); In re Pelletier, 5 UCC
Rep. Serv. 327 (D. Me. 1968); Peninsula State Bank v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 15 UCC
Rep. Serv. 503 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974); Karp Bros., Inc. v. West Ward Sav. & Loan, 440
Pa. 583, 271 A.2d 493 (1970).
13. Barry v. Bank of N.H., 113 N.H. 158, 293 A.2d 755 (1972); National Inv. Trust
v. First Nat'l Bank, 88 N.M. 514, 543 P.2d 482 (1975); Sussen Rubber Co. v. Hertz, 19
Ohio App. 2d 1, 249 N.E.2d 65 (1969).
14. A security interest which is enforceable means the secured party can satisfy the
debt against a debtor's particular collateral. If a security interest were not enforceable,
the secured party would have no specific source from which he could satisfy his debt.
The absence of an enforceable security interest has no effect on the debt owed to the
secured party.
15. U.C.C. § 9-303. Attachment is the process by which a secured party obtains a
security interest in a particular piece or class of collateral. Attachment is necessary to
establish the right to satisfy the debt from the collateral. Perfection is the process by
which a secured party establishes his priority to the collateral with regard to other
claimants to the collateral. Perfection presupposes attachment. U.C.C. § 9-303, com-
ment 1, further explains the perfection-attachment relationship.
16. There are six different types of collateral. Four types are defined in U.C.C. §
9-105(1):
(b) "Chattel paper" means a writing or writings which evidence both a mone-
tary obligation and a security interest in or a lease of specific goods, but a
charter or other contract invo)ving the use or hire of a vessel is not chattel paper.
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purpose of this article is to give meaning to the phrase "rights
in the collateral." The approach is an analysis of the phrase in
terms of two elements: the quantum of rights needed for a
When a transaction is evidenced both by such a security agreement or a lease
and by an instrument or a series of instruments, the group of writings taken
together constitutes chattel paper;
(f) "Document" means document of title as defined in the general definitions
of Article 1 (Section 1-201), and a receipt of the kind described in subsection
(2) of Section 7-201;
(h) "Goods" includes all things which are movable at the time the security
interest attaches or which are fixtures (Section 9-313), but does not include
money, documents, instruments, accounts, chattel paper, general intangibles,
or minerals or the like (including oil and gas) before extraction. "Goods" also
includes standing timber which is to be cut and removed under a conveyance
or contract for sale, the unborn young of animals, and growing crops;
(i) "Instrument" means a negotiable instrument (defined in Section 3-104), or
a security (defined in Section 8-102) or any other writing which evidences a right
to the payment of money and is not itself a security agreement or lease and is
of a type which is in ordinary course of business transferred by delivery with any
necessary indorsement or assignment.
Two types of collateral are defined in U.C.C. § 9-106:
"Account" means any right to payment for goods sold or leased or for services
rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper, whether or
not it has been earned by performance. "General intangibles" means any per-
sonal property (including things in action) other than goods, accounts, chattel
paper, documents, instruments, and money. All rights to payment earned or
unearned under a charter or other contract involving the use or hire of a vessel
and all rights incident to the charter or contract are accounts.
For purposes of this article, the focus will be on goods as the collateral because of the
particular significance Article 2 plays in the analysis of the questions posed. Citations,
however, will be provided for cases dealing with the other five types of collateral as
they are available. Goods are further subdivided into additional categories of collateral
as follows:
(1) "consumer goods" if they are used or bought for use primarily for per-
sonal, family or household purposes;
(2) "equipment" if they are used or bought for use primarily in business
(including farming or a profession) or by a debtor who is a non-profit organiza-
tion or a governmental subdivision or agency or if the goods are not included in
the definitions of inventory, farm products or consumer goods;
(3) "farm products" if they are crops or livestock or supplies used or pro-
duced in farming operations or if they are products of crops or livestock in their
unmanufactured states (such as ginned cotton, wool-clip, maple syrup, milk and
eggs), and if they are in the possession of a debtor engaged in raising, fattening,
grazing or other farming operations. If goods are farm products they are neither
equipment nor inventory;
(4) "inventory" if they are held by a person who holds them for sale or lease
or to be furnished under contracts of service or if he has so furnished them, or if
they are raw materials, work in process or materials used or consumed in a




debtor to qualify as having rights in the collateral" and the
necessity that the debtor possess the collateral.'8
I. THE QUANTUM ELEMENT
Before giving value in reliance that certain collateral" will
secure the debt, the secured party should first determine
whether the debtor 0 has rights in the collateral. The Code,
however, does not define the meaning of the phrase "rights in
the collateral."" The only reference to its meaning appears in
the explanatory reasons for the 1972 amendments to section 9-
204:12 "Former subsection (2) has been eliminated as unneces-
sary and in some cases confusing. Its operation appeared to be
arbitrary, and it is believed that the questions considered [the
meaning of rights in the collateral as related to different types
of collateral] are best left to the courts." ' It has, therefore,
17. One author states that a debtor has rights in the collateral when he has ac-
quired some legal or equitable right in it. C. BUNN, H. SNEAD & R. SPEIDEL, AN INTRO-
DUCrION TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 4.5 (1964).
18. This assumes that value and agreement have already occurred and that the
debtor needs only rights in the collateral as the last of the three requisites to be
completed under U.C.C. § 9-203. For "rights in the collateral" cases where the collat-
eral was not goods, see American East India Corp. v. Ideal Shoe Co., 400 F. Supp. 141
(E.D. Pa. 1975) (general intangibles); First Nat'l Bank v. Jefferson Sales & Distribs.,
Inc., 341 F. Supp. 659 (S.D. Miss. 1971) (account); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.
v. First State Bank, 208 Kan. 738, 494 P.2d 1149 (1972) (general intangibles); Crete
State Bank v. Lauhoff Grain Co., 195 Neb. 605, 239 N.W.2d 789 (1976) (general intan-
gibles); In re Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. New York, 48 App. Div. 2d 11, 367
N.Y.S.2d 580 (1975) (general intangibles); Corpus Christi Bank & Trust v. Smith, 525
S.W.2d 501 (Tex. 1975) (general intangibles).
19. The assumption that the secured party will give value in reliance on the fact
that proposed collateral will secure the debt is not always true. Value is given under
the Code when there is a preexisting claim or debt. See U.C.C. § 1-201(44)(b).
20. The term "debtor" is defined in U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(d):
"Debtor" means the person who owes payment or other performance of the
obligation secured, whether or not he owns or has rights in the collateral, and
includes the seller of accounts or chattel paper. Where the debtor and the owner
of the collateral are not the same person, the term "debtor" means the owner
of the collateral in any provision of the Article dealing with the collateral, the
obligor in any provision dealing with the obligation, and may include both where
the context so requires.
21. See Avco Delta Corp. v. United States, 459 F.2d 436 (7th Cir. 1972). See also
K.N.C. Wholesale, Inc. v. AWMCO, Inc., 55 Cal. App. 3d 43, 127 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1976).
22. The reason that the 1972 amendments merged the concepts of attachment and
enforceability into U.C.C. § 9-203 was to correct the anomalous situation under the
1962 Code whereby the security interest could attach under U.C.C. § 9-204 but not be
enforceable under U.C.C. § 9-203 because the debtor had not signed a security agree-
ment. U.C.C. app. at 761 (West 1972).
23. U.C.C. app. at 761 (West 1972).
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fallen upon the courts to assign a meaning to the tautology
"rights in the collateral." 4
The initial step in ascertaining whether the debtor has
rights in the collateral is an examination of the relationship of
the debtor to the collateral. 5 The quantum of rights imbued in
the debtor as a result of this relationship determines whether
the debtor has sufficient rights in the collateral to satisfy the
quantum element. Since a debtor can acquire property that
may be used as collateral by means of a sale, lease, bailment
or consignment, these relationships will be analyzed. Also ex-
amined will be the effects of agency, voidable title and consent
of the owner of the collateral.
A. Sale
A sale consists of the passing of title from the seller to the
buyer for a price." A buyer is defined as a person who buys or
contracts to buy goods,27 but the quantum of rights that a
buyer-debtor of goods receives is not clear. A seller's rights,
24. Collateral is defined as property subject to a security interest. U.C.C. § 9.
105(1)(c). If a person possesses collateral, he therefore must necessarily have had rights
in it to have created a security interest therein. Therefore, it is circular reasoning to
use the phrase "rights in the collateral."
25. In re Pelletier, 5 UCC Rep. Serv. 327 (D. Me. 1968) is the first case to suggest
that the relationship of the debtor to the collateral is important under Article 9. In
Pelletier, the relationship was important for determining the proper place to file a
financing statement. The debtor in Pelletier purchased a camper while in transit
between residences. Because of this, the secured party was faced with the problem of
deciding where to file its financing statement. The court held that the proper place of
filing is the place where the security interest attaches. The court used the following
reasoning in reaching its conclusion:
By the same token it is not easy to understand why the moment of filing a
financing statement four years prior to the debtor's acquisition of any rights in
the after-acquired collateral ought to be the time for making those determina-
tions upon which the place of filing depends. It does indeed seem sensible that
no security interest may be said to have attached until the debtor has acquired
rights in the collateral. And to elect as the place for filing the financing state-
ment the debtor's residence at a time when there is no contemplated or actual
relationship between the debtor and the after-acquired collateral seems any-
thing but helpful to those who must rely upon the public record. Selection of
the place of filing on the basis of the debtor's residence at the time the security
interest attaches can provide the searcher with helpful extrinsic clues as to
where the filing should have been made.
Id. at 334 (footnotes omitted).
See also Air Traffic Conf. v. Downtown Travel Center, Inc., 18 UCC Rep. Serv. 1202
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976); Poteet v. Winter Garden Prod. Credit Ass'n, 546 S.W.2d 650
(Tex. 1977).
26. U.C.C. § 2-106(1).
27. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(a).
1977]
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however, are more explicit. A seller 8 of goods who retains or
reserves title, notwithstanding shipment or delivery to the
buyer, is deemed to have reserved a security interest. 9 The
Code, therefore, implies that if a seller has a security interest
in a buyer-debtor's goods (collateral), then the buyer-debtor
has a sufficient quantum of rights in the collateral .3 The ques-
tion is, however, precisely what is that quantum of rights?
A security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding
its sale, exchange or other disposition.31 The buyer-debtor has
the power to sell, transfer, exchange or otherwise dispose of the
collateral.32 This power to sell logically would include lesser
powers, such as the ability to lease, license, or create a security
interest in the goods. In In re Ten Brock,3 3 a trustee in bank-
ruptcy argued that a buyer of a camper had no rights in the
collateral sufficient to create a security interest in favor of a
secured party. The court disagreed, holding the buyer-debtor
acquired rights in the camper through the purchase agreement
28. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(d).
29. U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
"Security interest" means an interest in personal property or fixtures which
secures payment or performance of an obligation. The retention or reservation
of title by a seller of goods notwithstanding shipment or delivery to the buyer
(Section 2-401) is limited in effect to a reservation of a "security interest". The
term also includes any interest of a buyer of accounts or chattel paper which is
subject to Article 9. The special property interest of a buyer of goods on identifi-
cation of such goods to a contract for sale under Section 2-401 is not a "security
interest", but a buyer may also acquire a "security interest" by complying with
Article 9. Unless a lease or consignment is intended as security, reservation of
title thereunder is not a "security interest" but a consignment is in any event
subject to the provisions on consignment sales (Section 2-326). Whether a lease
is intended as security is to be determined by the facts of each case; however,
(a) the inclusion of an option to purchase does not of itself make the lease one
intended for security, and (b) an agreement that upon compliance with the
terms of the lease the lessee shall become or has the option to become the owner
of the property for no additional consideration or for a nominal consideration
does make the lease one intended for security.
30. A seller has a security interest in the collateral when the requirements of U.C.C.
§ 9-203 have been complied with. The parties have made an agreement (a contract of
sale), value has been given (the sale price) and the buyer-debtor must have had rights
in the collateral sufficient to grant the security interest. The security interest, however,
may not have attached unless the seller possesses the collateral or there is a security
agreement (written contract of sale) in existence.
31. U.C.C. § 9-306(2).
32. The security agreement between the debtor and the secured part can restrict
the debtor's rights regarding the collateral, but under U.C.C. § 9-307 such restrictions
will have no effect on a buyer in the ordinary course of business.
33. 4 UCC Rep. Serv. 712 (W.D. Mich. 1976).
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and delivery of possession pursuant to the security agreement
with the seller. 4 A buyer-debtor of the collateral, therefore, by
virtue of possessing the power to selP5 (to transfer good title)
has the requisite quantum of rights.
B. Lease
A lease is a contractual arrangement whereby the lessor
grants to the lessee-debtor the right to use and possess the
leased property" as collateral. In a lease, the lessor retains title
to the goods. 7 The retention or reservation of title by a lessor
is not a security interest unless the lease is intended as secu-
rity. 8 If the lease is intended as security, the transaction con-
stitutes a conditional sale. 9
Whether a lease is intended as security is determined on an
ad hoc basis. An agreement that upon compliance with the
terms of the lease the lessor shall become or has the option to
become the owner of the property for no additional considera-
tion or for nominal consideration amounts to a conditional sale
and the lease, therefore, is intended as security." In Karp
Brothers, Inc. v. Westward Savings & Loan Association,41 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the execution of a bail-
ment lease of restaurant equipment containing an agreement
giving the lessee the right to become the owner of the property
for no additional consideration or for a nominal consideration
34. Id. at 715.
35. For two cases holding that the debtor had rights in the collateral because he
had the power to sell, see Douglas-Guardian Warehouse Corp. v. Esslair, 10 UCC Rep.
Serv. 176 (W.D. Mich. 1971); Swets Motor Sales, Inc. v. Pruisner, 236 N.W.2d 299
(Iowa 1975).
36. Sanders v. Commercial Credit Corp., 398 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1968); In re Univer-
sal Medical Servs., Inc., 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 614 (E.D. Pa. 1970); In re Falco Prods. Co.,
5 UCC Rep. Serv. 264 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Gibreal Auto Sales, Inc. v. Missouri Valley
Mach. Co., 186 Neb. 763, 186 N.W.2d 719 (1971).
37. Sanders v. National Acceptance Co., 383 F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1967); In re Over-
brook & Barson's, Inc., 5 UCC Rep. Serv. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1968); In re Alpha Creamery
Co., 4 UCC Rep. Serv. 794 (W.D. Mich. 1967).
38. U.C.C. § 1-201(37). For a discussion of loans intended as security, see Stanley
v. Fabricators, Inc., 459 P.2d 467 (Alas. 1969); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Michigan Bank, N.A.,
12 UCC Rep. Serv. 745 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1972); J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COIMMERCIAL CODE 762-64 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
WHITE & SUMMERS].
39. A conditional sale is a simple transaction whereby the seller retains title to the
goods sold until the buyer has made payment in full. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note
38, at 755.
40. 459 P.2d at 469. See the definition of a security interest, supra note 2.
41. 440 Pa. 583, 271 A.2d 493 (1970).
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created a security interest in the property for the lessor. The
court further found the lessee-debtor had thereby acquired the
requisite quantum of rights.
42
There are numerous factors which must be considered in
resolving the issue of whether a lease is a true lease or one
intended as security.43 The simple inclusion of an option to
purchase does not of itself make the lease one intended as
security." The two most important factors indicating that the
transaction is a true lease are that the lessee is acquiring no
equity in the leased article during the term of the lease and that
the option price, if any, approximates the market value at the
time of exercise. 5 In First National Bank & Trust Co. v.
Smithhoff, 4 the court held that the lease did not create a secu-
42. Id. at 588, 271 A.2d at 496.
43. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 38, at 762.
44. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
45. In In re Alpha Creamery Co., 4 UCC Rep. Serv. 794 (W. D. Mich. 1967), where
the court found a lease of a typewriter accounting machine to be a true lease, the court
made the following statement:
From such cases and other authorities on this subject the following factors
should be considered in determining whether or not a lease is a security agree-
ment:
1. The facts in each case control to show intention of the parties to create
a security interest.
2. Reservation of title in a lease or option to purchase appurtenant to or
included in the lease does not in and of itself make the lease a security agree-
ment.
3. Lease agreement which permits the lessee to become the owner at the
end of the term of the lease for a nominal or for no additional consideration is
deemed intended as a security agreement as a matter of law.
4. The percentage that option purchase price bears to the list price, espe-
cially if it is less than 25%, is to be considered as showing the intent of the
parties to make a lease as security.
5. Where the terms of the lease and option to purchase are such that the
only sensible course for the lessee at the end of the lease term is to exercise the
option and become the owner of the goods, the lease was intended to create a
security interest.
6. The character of a transaction as a true lease is indicated by:
(a) Provision specifying purchase option price which is approximately the
market value at the time of the exercise of the option.
(b) Rental charges indicating an intention to compensate lessor for loss of
value over the term of the lease due to aging, wear and obsolescence.
(c) Rentals which are not excessive and option purchase price which is not
too low.
(d) Facts showing that the lessee is acquiring no equity in leased article
during the term of lease.
Id. at 797-98.
46. 119 Ga. App. 284, 167 S.E.2d 190 (1969).
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rity interest because the lease agreement did not give the lessee
the right to proceed directly against the lessor's interest in the
collateral which would have been similar to granting a security
interest in the collateral." In Disch v. Raven Transfer & Stor-
age Co.,4" the court held in a true lease case that the lessee of
goods could not create a security interest in the goods in favor
of a good faith purchaser49 because the lessee did not have
rights in the collateral. Mere lawful possession was not a quan-
tum of rights sufficient to vest the lessee-debtor with rights in
the collateral."
A lessee-debtor in a disguised sale transaction does acquire
a sufficient quantum of rights to have rights in the collateral
as that term is used in section 9-203(1) (c). A lessee-debtor in a
true lease transaction, however, does not acquire a sufficient
quantum of rights. It has been said the essential distinction
between a lease and a conditional sale is that in a lease the
lessee never owns the property." This statement is correct al-
though the language needs refinement. The lessee-debtor is a
disguised buyer in a transaction where the lease is intended as
security. This disguised buyer has the same right that a dis-
closed buyer has regarding the goods - the power to transfer
good title 2 The power to transfer good title vests the lessee-
debtor in a conditional sale transaction, as contrasted with the
true lease transaction, with the requisite quantum of rights.
47. See First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. McElmurray, 120 Ga. 134, 169 S.E.2d 720
(1969).
48. 17 Wash. App. 73, 561 P.2d 1097 (1977).
49. U.C.C. §§ 1-201(19), (32) and (33).
50. 17 Wash. App. at -, 561 P.2d at 1099. See also C.I.T. Financial Servs. Corp.
v. First Nat'l Bank, 344 So. 2d 125 (Miss. 1977); Cordle v. Lincoln Moving & Storage,
Inc., 19 UCC Rep. Serv. 1204 (Neb. Dist. Ct. 1976); Texas State Bank v. Foremost Ins.
Co., 477 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972).
51. In UniRoyal, Inc. v. Michigan Bank, N.A., 12 UCC Rep. Serv. 745 (Mich. Cir.
Ct. 1972), the court found a tire mileage agreement whereby tires were leased to a
debtor to be a lease intended as security. The court stated,
All cases cited to the court have been read and both sides have presented
excellent arguments to support their positions. It appears that the cases cited
by defendant present the better reasoned approach. The prime essential distinc-
tion between a lease and a conditional sale is that in a lease the lessee never
owns the property. In the absence of a right or option in the lessee to acquire
ownership of the leased property, the transaction is one of pure lease.
Id. at 750.




A buyer has voidable title to goods when they have been
delivered under a transaction of purchase whereby (a) the
transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, or
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later
dishonored, or (c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be
a "cash sale," or (d) the delivery was procured through fraud
punishable as larcenous under criminal law.53 The buyer-
debtor with voidable title to the delivered goods possesses them
for use as potential collateral.
The analysis of the voidable title-debtor's rights in the col-
lateral is best introduced by reference to three recent decisions
which reach different conclusions on virtually the same facts.
In Zion's First National Bank v. First Security Bank,54 the
voidable title-debtor received the goods under an agreement
that title would pass only upon payment.5 Payment, however,
was not made upon receipt of the goods. The unpaid seller's
priority was disputed by a secured party of the voidable title-
debtor who claimed priority to the goods through an after-
acquired property clause. The Supreme Court of Utah ruled
that the voidable title-debtor never acquired any "rights in the
collateral" and therefore could not create a security interest in
favor of the secured party.56 In In re Samuels & Co.,57 the voida-
ble title-debtor received the goods in consideration for checks
which were subsequently dishonored .5  The unpaid seller
claimed first priority to the goods by virtue of a cash seller's
reclamation right. 9 A secured party of the voidable title-debtor
claimed priority to the goods by virtue of an after-acquired
53. U.C.C. § 2-403(1).
54. 534 P.2d 900 (Utah 1975).
55. Such an agreement falls within the purview of U.C.C. § 2-403(1)(c) and would
be deemed a cash sale. The buyer would possess a voidable title.
56. 534 P.2d at 902.
57. 483 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1973), rev'd & rem'd sub nom. Mahon v. Stowers, 416
U.S. 100 (1974); on remand, 510 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1975), reheard & rev'd 526 F.2d
1238 (5th Cir. 1976).
58. The facts would fall within the purview of U.C.C. § 2-403(1)(b). The buyer
would possess a voidable title.
59. The cash seller's reclamation right is based on U.C.C. §§ 2-507 (2) and 2-511(3).
Section 2-507(2) provides that when payment is due upon delivery, the buyer's right
to retain or dispose of the goods is conditional upon his making payment. Section 2-
511(3) provides that when payment is made by check, it is conditional and is defeated
between the parties upon dishonor. The seller, upon dishonor, has ten days to exercise
his right of reclamation.
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property clause. The Fifth Circuit held that the voidable title-
debtor did acquire rights in the collateral sufficient to create a
"security interest in favor of the secured party."60 And finally,
in In re American Food Purveyors, Inc.,6" a voidable title-
debtor received the goods after making misrepresentations to
the seller.62 The unpaid seller again claimed first priority to the
goods by virtue of a credit seller's reclamation rightr A secured
party of the voidable title-debtor claimed priority to the goods
by virtue of an after-acquired property clause. The district
court held that the voidable title-debtor did not acquire any
rights in the collateral during the ten day period of the credit
seller's reclamation right. 4 Since the seller sought to reclaim
within the ten day period, the voidable title-debtor never ac-
quired any rights in the collateral, and therefore could not
create a security interest in favor of the secured party. 5
The court in Samuels is correct. A person with voidable title
has power to transfer good title to a good faith purchaser for
value.6 A purchaser is a person who takes by purchase, 7 in-
cluding a lienholder.6 5 A person can acquire a lien on the goods
in the possession of the voidable title-debtor. Therefore, a void-
able title-debtor has sufficient rights in the collateral to permit
a lien to attach.
60. 526 F.2d at 1246-48.
61. 17 UCC Rep. Serv. 436 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
62. This case does not fall clearly within the coverage of U.C.C. § 2-403(1). Subsec-
tions (a) and (c) have no application. The misrepresentations made by the buyer
concerned the buyer's solvency, which would not amount to fraud punishable as lar-
cenous under U.C.C. § 2-403(1)(d). Although the buyer stated that he sent a check in
payment, in fact, no check was ever sent to put the case within U.C.C. § 2-403(1)(b).
The classification, however, should not turn upon whether the fraudulent party ac-
tually tendered a check or not.
63. See U.C.C. § 2-702(2).
64. The cash seller has the same ten day limitation to its reclamation right. U.C.C.
§ 2-507, comment 3, states,
Subsection (2) deals with the effect of a conditional delivery by the seller and
in such a situation makes the buyer's "right as against the seller" conditional
upon payment. These words are used as words of limitation to conform with the
policy set forth in the bona fide purchase sections of this Article. Should the
seller after making such a conditional delivery fail to follow up his rights, the
condition is waived. The provision of this Article for a ten day limit within which
the seller may reclaim goods delivered on credit to an insolvent buyer is also
applicable here.
65. 17 UCC Rep. Serv. at 443.
66. U.C.C. § 2-403. See also Jordan v. Butler, 182 Neb. 626,156 N.W. 2d 778 (1968).
67. U.C.C. § 1-201(33).
68. U.C.C. § 1-201(32).
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An Article 9 security interest is functionally identical to a
lien. The only difference between a lien and a security interest
is that a security interest is acquired by consent while a lien is
acquired by attachment, levy or the like.69 Therefore, if a voida-
ble title-debtor has sufficient rights in the collateral to permit
a lien to attach, a fortiori a voidable title-debtor has sufficient
rights in the collateral to permit a security interest to attach.
A good faith purchaser includes a person who takes by a
voluntary transaction creating an interest in property. 0 The
grant of a security interest is a voluntary creation of an interest
in property.71 A secured party is a lender, seller or other person
in whose favor there is a security interest.72 A secured party can
also be a good faith purchaser for value." Since a voidable title-
debtor has the power to transfer good title to a good faith pur-
chaser for value,' 4 a voidable title-debtor has the power to
transfer good title to a secured party. Therefore, a voidable
title-debtor has the requisite quantum of rights under section
9-203(1)(c).
Since the voidable title-debtor does have rights -in the col-
lateral,7 5 the secured party's security interest can attach to the
collateral by virtue of an after-acquired property clause. When
this occurs the secured party's security interest in the collateral
has priority over the reclamation right of either the cash or
credit seller.76 The credit seller may reclaim goods from the
buyer-debtor upon demand made within ten days after receipt
if the buyer-debtor has received the goods while insolvent.77
69. U.C.C. § 9-301(3).
70. U.C.C. § 1-201(32).
71. U.C.C. § 9-102. The official comment to 9-102 states that the main purpose of
the section is to bring all consensual security interests in personal property and fixtures
under Article 9, except for transactions excluded by section 9-104.
72. U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(m).
73. United States v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank, 505 F.2d 1064 (10th Cir. 1974); In re
Hayward Woolen Co., 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 1107 (D. Mass. 1967); Guy Martin Buick, Inc.
v. Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank, 184 Colo. 166, 519 P.2d 354 (1974); Swets Motor Sales,
Inc. v. Pruisner, 236 N.W.2d 299 (Iowa 1975); Jordan v. Butler, 182 Neb. 626, 156
N.W.2d 778 (1968); First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Academic Archives, Inc., 10
N.C. App. 619, 179 S.E.2d 850 (1971). Contra, In re American Food Purveyors, Inc.,
17 UCC Rep. Serv. 436 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Mother Lode Bank v. General Motors Accept-
ance Corp., 46 Cal. App. 3d 807, 120 Cal. Rptr. 429 (1975).
74. U.C.C. § 2-403.
75. See text accompanying footnotes 53 through 84, supra.
76. For the seller's reclamation right defeating a trustee in bankruptcy, see In re
Mort, 208 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
77. U.C.C. § 2-702(2).
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The credit seller's right to reclaim, however, is subject to the
rights of a good faith purchaser, 8 and since a secured party is
a good faith purchaser, the credit seller's reclamation right is
subordinate to the rights of a secured party. In a cash sale,
where payment is due and demanded upon delivery of the
goods, a buyer-debtor's right to retain or dispose of the goods
is conditional upon his making payment.79 Payment by check
is conditional, and is defeated if the check is dishonored." The
cash seller has the right to reclaim the goods from the buyer-
debtor on demand within ten days after defeat of payment."
However, as in the case of the credit seller, the cash seller's
right to reclaim is also subject to the rights of a good faith
purchaser. 82 Therefore, since a secured party is a good faith
purchaser, the cash seller's reclamation right is subordinate to
the rights of a secured party.
In sum, because the ordinary buyer-debtor has the power to
transfer good title to the collateral, he is vested with the requi-
site quantum of rights to create a security interest., Likewise,
the voidable title-debtor has the power to transfer good title by
statute." Hence, the "power to transfer good title" thus vests
the voidable title-debtor with the requisite quantum of rights
under section 9-203(1)(c).
D. Bailment
A bailment occurs when a person possesses another person's
property. 5 A bailment can be either voluntary or involuntary.88
The bailor retains title to the goods similar to a lessor in a lease
situation. 7 Unlike the lease transaction, there is no conditional
78. U.C.C. § 2-702(3). See In re Hayward Woolen Co., 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 1107 (D.
Mass. 1967). For the same result when a cash sale is converted into a credit sale, see
Galleon Indus., Inc. v. Lewyn Mach. Co., 50 Ala. App. 334, 279 So. 2d 137 (1973).
79. U.C.C. § 2-507(2).
80. U.C.C. § 2-511(3).
81. U.C.C. § 2-507, comment 3.
82. Id. But see In re Lindenbaum's, Inc., 2 UCC Rep. Serv. 495 (E.D. Pa. 1964),
where the court erroneously held the cash seller's reclamation right to be equal to a
secured creditor's. See also United States v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank, 505 F.2d 1064 (10th
Cir. 1974); In re Samuels, 483 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1973); Guy Martin Buick, Inc. v.
Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank, 184 Colo. 166, 519 P.2d 354 (1974).
83. See text accompanying footnotes 26 through 35, supra.
84. U.C.C. § 2-403.
85. R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERsoNAL PROPERTY 209 (3d ed. 1975).
86. Id. at 319-20.
87. Id. at 228.
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sale problem in .a bailment for several reasons. First, the bailee
usually possesses the goods to benefit the bailor rather than for
the use and enjoyment of the bailee. Second, the bailment is
normaly for a duration much shorter than the life of the bailee's
property. Third, payments customarily pass from the bailor to
the bailee, as contrasted with a lease where rent passes from
the lessee to the lessor.
The voidable title-debtor has a broad power to transfer good
title.88 The bailee-debtor, on the other hand, has a limited
power to transfer good title.89 Any entrustment" of goods to a
merchant" who deals in goods of that kind gives the merchant
the power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in
the ordinary course of business.92 A bailee-debtor who deals in
goods of the kind entrusted could, therefore, transfer good title
to a buyer in the ordinary course of business. A buyer in the
ordinary course of business is someone who in good faith93 and
without knowledge94 that the sale" to him is in violation of the
ownership rights or security interest of a third party in the
goods, buys in the ordinary course from someone in the busi-
ness of selling goods of that kind. A buyer is defined as a
person who buys or contracts to buy goods. 7 A secured party
is not a buyer because a secured party is neither buying nor
contracting to buy goods when he claims his security interest
attaches to the goods in the possession of the bailee-debtor 5
88. See text accompanying footnotes 53 through 84, supra. See also U.C.C. § 2-
403(1).
89. U.C.C. § 2-403(2).
90. U.C.C. § 2-403(3). The Code defines "entrusting" as follows:
"Entrusting" includes any delivery and any acquiescence in retention of
possession regardless of any condition expressed between the parties to the
delivery or acquiescence and regardless of whether the procurement of the en-
trusting or the possessor's disposition of the goods have been such as to be
larcenous under the criminal law.
91. U.C.C. § 2-104(1). That section defines "merchant" as follows:
"Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by
his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the
practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill
may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermedi-
ary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.
92. U.C.C. § 1-201(9).
93. U.C.C. § 1-201(19).
94. U.C.C. § 1-201(25).
95. U.C.C. § 2-106.
96. U.C.C. § 1-201(9).
97. U.C.C. § 2-103.
98. U.C.C. § 2-403, comment 2.
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A secured party is a good faith purchaser for value,99 but is not
a buyer in the ordinary course of business. Since a secured
party is not a buyer in the ordinary course of business, a bailee-
debtor does not have the power to transfer good title to a se-
cured party. The bailee-debtor, therefore, does not have the
requisite quantum of rights.
In Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc., 10 6 a buyer returned for
modification and adjustment some of equipment it had pur-
chased from the seller. A secured party of the seller claimed
priority to the equipment by virtue of its security interest in the
seller's inventory. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that
the rights acquired by the seller on return of the equipment
were those of a bailee who had a possessory interest for a lim-
ited purpose, but did not amount to rights in the collateral
under section 9-203(1)(c). 0' In Cain v. Country Club Delicates-
sen, Inc.,0 2 the bailee-debtor was in possession of goods for a
period of time prior to purchasing them. A secured party of the
bailee-debtor claimed a security interest in the goods prior to
the time that they were purchased. The court ruled that the
secured party did not have a security interest in the goods prior
to their purchase because the bailee-debtor did not have rights
in the collateral.'" 3 And finally, in Cordle v. Lincoln Moving &
Storage, Inc.,' 4 the court found that an involuntary bailee in
possession of property could not create a security interest
therein for lack of sufficient rights in the collateral.'
The essential element clothing the bailee-debtor with the
requisite quantum of rights under section 9-203(1)(c) is absent.
The Cain court identified this element in holding the bailee-
debtor would not acquire rights in the collateral under section
9-203(1)(c) until he purchased the goods. 08 The essential miss-
ing element, then, is the power to transfer good title to the
collateral.
99. U.C.C. § 1-201.
100. 59 Wis. 2d 219, 208 N.W.2d 97 (1973).
101. Id. at 235, 208 N.W.2d at 104. The decision in Adamatic was actually based
on the rights in the collateral language in U.C.C. § 9-204 before the 1972 amendments
were adopted in Wisconsin.
102. 25 Conn. Supp. 327, 203 A.2d 441 (1964).
103. Id. at -, 203 A.2d at 444.
104. 19 UCC Rep. Serv. 1204 (Neb. Dist. Ct. 1970).
105. Id. at 1205.




The debtor in Article 9 is the person who owes payment or
other performance of the obligation secured; he is not necessar-
ily the owner of the collateral.107 He may own or have rights in
the collateral.' 8 As previously noted, a debtor cannot create a
security interest in collateral unless he has sufficient rights in
the collateral. The debtor can personally possess these rights
or derive the requisite quantum of rights through the consent
of the owner of the collateral."°9
In Landy Co. v. Asch,"0 a corporation attempted to create
a security interest in certain collateral in favor of a secured
party after it had transferred such collateral by a deed of trust
to a trustee. The court found the corporation had no rights in
the collateral enabling it to convey or encumber the property.'
Similarly, in In re Central Pipeline & Cable Co.," 2 officers of a
corporation obtained loans in their personal names to repay a
debt of the corporation. The individual officers granted the
lender a security interest in a truck titled to the corporation.
Upon bankruptcy, the court held that the alleged secured
lender did not have a security interest in the truck because the
officers never acquired ownership of the truck. The officers,
therefore, never had any rights in the collateral.
In those cases where the debtor does not have the requisite
quantum of rights in the collateral to satisfy section 9-
203(1)(c), the owner's consent must be proved. It must also be
shown that the owner had the authority to consent. In Branch
v. Steph, 113 corporate shareholders of one corporation who pur-
chased stock in another corporation had the first corporation
grant a security interest in its assets in favor of the seller of the
stock. The court held that the seller had no security interest in
107. See U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(d); U.C.C. § 9-112. The caption of that section reads,
"Where Collateral Is Not Owned by Debtor."
108. Id.
109. McCrackin v. Hayes, 118 Ga. App. 267, 163 S.E.2d 246 (1968); C.I.T. Finan-
cial Servs. Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 344 So. 2d 125 (Miss. 1977); Texas State Bank
v. Foremost Ins. Co., 477 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972); Clearfield State Bank v.
Contos, 562 P.2d 622 (Utah 1977).
110. 267 Md. 251, 297 A.2d 285 (1972).
111. Id. at , 297 A.2d at 286.
112. 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 426 (W.D. Okla. 1970).
113. 389 F.2d 233 (10th Cir. 1968).
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the corporate assets because the corporation had no authority
to encumber its assets to secure the personal debt of its share-
holders."1
Consent can be actual, implied or apparent. In K.N.C.
Wholesale, Inc. v. A WMCO, Inc.,"5 a subsidiary granted a se-
curity interest in equipment to a secured creditor. The secured
creditor subsequently released its claim against the subsidiary
and asserted it against the parent. The parent then granted a
security interest to the creditor in the same equipment of the
subsidiary. The court held that the parent had the requisite
quantum of rights under section 9-203(l)(c) because it could be
reasonably inferred that the subsidiary consented to vest the
parent with such rights in the collateral."' In Disch v. Raven
Transfer & Storage Co., 117 a lessee of goods attempted to create
a security interest in goods in favor of a creditor. The secured
creditor claimed that the lessee had the requisite quantum of
rights because of the apparent authority created by entrusting
the lessee with possession of the goods. The court disagreed and
found that simply entrusting the lessee with possession of the
goods is not enough to constitute apparent authority."'
In Avco Delta Corporation v. United States,"9 a parent cor-
poration owned two subsidiaries - S1 and S2. S1 created a
security interest in favor of a secured party in equipment
owned by S2. Both the parent and S2 guaranteed payment of
the loan to S1. The government asserted a tax lien against S2's
equipment and argued that there was no security interest in the
equipment of S2 because S1 never had any rights in the collat-
eral. The Seventh Circuit, however, held that S1 did have
rights in the collateral which arose through the acquiescence in
and guarantee of the loan by S2 and the parent with the se-
cured party.'20 The court found that an estoppel' 2' was created
114. Id. at 236. For an authority case dealing with joint property, see Clearfield
State Bank v. Contos, 562 P.2d 622 (Utah 1977). For a case indicating that even if the
collateral is in another's name, the court will hear evidence to determine if the non-
title holder has rights in the collateral, see Peninsula State Bank v. Beneficial Fin. Co.,
15 UCC Rep. Serv. 503 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974).
115. 55 Cal. App. 3d 43, 127 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1976).
116. Id., at-, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
117. 17 Wash. App. 73, 561 P.2d 1097 (1977).
118. Id. at _ 561 P.2d at 1110. See also Peninsula State Bank v. Beneficial Fin.
Co., 15 UCC Rep. Serv. 503 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974).
119. 459 F.2d 436 (7th Cir. 1972).
120. Id. at 441.
121. The doctrine of estoppel provides that a party who makes a promise or an
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in favor of the secured party.2 2 Furthermore, the court pro-
vided some insight into those situations where a debtor will
have the requisite quantum of rights in the collateral under
section 9-203(1)(c) by virtue of apparent consent:
The Illinois Supreme Court early stated the principle in
Anderson v. Armstead, 69 Ill. 452, 454-55 (1873):
"The law is familiar, that where the owner of property
holds out another, or allows him to appear as the owner of,
or as having full power of disposition over the property, and
innocent parties are thus led into dealing with such apparent
owner, or person having the apparent power of disposition,
they will be protected. Their rights, in such cases, do not
depend upon the actual title or authority of the party with
whom they have directly dealt, but they are derived from the
act of the real owner, which precludes him from disputing, as
against them, the existence of the title or power he caused or
allowed to appear to be vested in the party, upon the faith of
whose title, or power, they dealt."'2
Thus, the requisite quantum of rights under section 9-
203(1)(c) can be obtained by consent, and the determination
of whether the debtor has the requisite quantum of rights to
satisfy section 9-203(1)(c) turns on the traditional analysis of
actual, implied or apparent consent.
F. Consignment
A true consignment relationship is created when goods de-
livered to the buyer may be returned even though they conform
to the contract.12 4 A reservation of title under a true consign-
ment is not a security interest.'1 A true consignment must be
distinguished from a consignment intended as security. 26 A
innocent representation of fact upon which the other party justifiably relies to his
detriment is estopped from denying his utterances to the detriment of the other party.
J. CALAMA & J. PERMLO, THE LAW OF CoNTRACTs, 268-69 (1970). See also Arrow
Lathing & Plastering, Inc. v. Schaulat Plumbing Supply Co., 83 Ill. App. 2d 394, 228
N.E.2d 209 (1967); American Bank & Trust Co. v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 251 La.
445, 205 So. 2d 35 (1967); Carruthers v. Whitney, 56 Wash. 327, 105 P. 831 (1909).
122. 459 F.2d at 441. The court further added that an estoppel could be express,
implied or even created by silence. Id.
123. Id. For a case preventing a party from claiming apparent authority because
he knew the extent of the agent's authority, see Branch v. Steph, 389 F.2d 233 (10th
Cir. 1968).
124. U.C.C. § 2-326(1).




reservation of title under a consignment intended as security
is a security interest. A consignment intended as security is,
therefore, a disguised sale, and the consignee-debtor has the
rights of a buyer. As a buyer, the consignee-debtor possesses
the power to transfer good title. This power vests the consignee-
debtor with the requisite quantum of rights to create p security
interest.
There are basically two kinds of true consignments under
the Code - a "sale on approval" and a "sale or return.""' A
consigned sale on approval occurs when the goods are delivered
to the consignee-debtor primarily for use.' '2 The goods are de-
livered to the proposed buyer but they remain the property of
the seller until the buyer accepts them.'2 The buyer is gener-
ally thought to be testing the goods on a trial basis. Goods held
by a consignee-debtor "on approval" are not subject to the
claims of the consignee-debtor's creditors until acceptance.'30
127. U.C.C. § 2-326.
128. Id.
129. U.C.C. § 2-326, comment 1. The comment provides:
A "sale on approval" or "sale or return" is distinct from other types of
transactions with which they have frequently been confused. The type of "sale
on approval," "on trial"or "on satisfaction" dealt with involves a contract under
which the seller undertakes a particular business risk to satisfy his prospective
buyer with the appearance or performance of the goods in question. The goods
are delivered to the proposed purchaser but they remain the property of the
seller until the buyer accepts them. The price has already been agreed. The
buyer's willingness to receive and test the goods is the consideration for the
seller's engagement to deliver and sell.
130. U.C.C. § 2-326(2) states that goods held on approval are not subject to the
claims of the buyer's creditors until acceptance. However, if the consignment falls
within the purview of U.C.C. § 2-326(3), the goods are subject to creditors' claims
notwithstanding the sale is allegedly on approval. U.C.C. § 2-326(3) states,
Where goods are delivered to a person for sale and such person maintains a
place of business at which he deals in goods of the kind involved, under a name
other than the name of the person making delivery, then with respect to claims
of creditors of the person conducting the business the goods are deemed to be
on sale or return. The provisions of this subsection are applicable even though
an agreement purports to reserve title to the person making delivery until pay-
ment or resale or uses such words as "on consignment" or "on memorandum".
However, this subsection is not applicable if the person making delivery
(a) complies with an applicable law providing for a consignor's interest
or the like to be evidenced by a sign, or
(b) establishes that the person conducting the business is generally
known by his creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of
others, or




Therefore, until acceptance, the consignee-debtor possessing
goods on approval does not have the requisite quantum of
rights in the collateral to permit a security interest to attach.
A consigned sale or return occurs when the goods are deliv-
ered to the consignee-debtor primarily for resale.'3' The goods
are delivered to the consignee-debtor with the understanding
that the consignor'32 will take them back if they are not re-
sold.' 33 Goods held by a consignee-debtor for sale or return are
subject to the claims of the consignee-debtor's creditors while
in his possession. 134 In Sussen Rubber Co. v. Hertz, 135 a priority
dispute arose between a consignor of goods and a secured party
of the consignee-debtor in possession of goods for "sale or re-
turn." The consignor argued that the secured creditor's se-
curity interest did not attach to the collateral because the
consignee-debtor did not have rights in the collateral. The
court held that the security interest did attach because "as
far as creditors are concerned such property may be treated
as if owned by the debtor."' 3' Therefore, a consignee-debtor
possessing goods for "sale or return" has the requisite quantum
of rights in the collateral to permit a security interest to attach.
A comparison of the consignee-debtor's relationship to the
goods under a sale on approval with a sale or return is instruc-
131. U.C.C. § 2-326(l).
132. The consignor should always protect his interest in the goods by following the
procedure provided in U.C.C. § 2-326(3)(a)-(c), which gives the consignor three differ-
ent ways to protect and preserve his interest in the goods as against consignee's credi-
tors. The simplest and safest method is to file a financing statement with regard to
the goods under U.C.C. § 2-326(3)(c). The consignor, then, has first priority to the
consigned goods notwithstanding there may have been a prior secured party filed
against the consignee's after-acquired property. This, of course, presupposes that the
consignor complies with U.C.C. § 9-114 to acquire his preferred status. See Sussen
Rubber Co. v. Hertz, 19 Ohio App. 2d 1, 249 N.E.2d 65 (1969).
133. U.C.C. § 2-326, comment 1.
134. U.C.C. § 2-326(2). The priority dispute between the unprotected consignor
and the consignee's creditors is resolved in favor of the consignee's creditors. U.C.C. §
9-114(2). Comment 1 provides that
where goods are furnished to a merchant under the arrangement known as
consignment rather than in a security transaction, the consignor must, in order
to protect his position as against an inventory secured party of the consignee,
give to that party the same notice and at the same time that he would give to
that party if that party had filed first with respect to inventory and if the
consignor were furnishing the goods under an inventory security agreement in-
stead of under a consignment.
The consignor's protection is provided by U.C.C. § 2-326(3).
135. 19 Ohio App. 2d 1, 249 N.E.2d 65 (1969).
136. Id. at 6, 249 N.E.2d at 68.
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tive. The difference between the two types of consignments lies
in the quantum of rights inhering in the consignee-debtor
under each type of consignment. In a sale on approval consign-
ment, the consignee-debtor has the goods primarily for use,
while in a sale or return consignment, the consignee-debtor has
the goods primarily for resale. In a sale or return consignment,
the consignee-debtor possesses the essential power to transfer
good title. In a sale on approval consignment, however, the
consignee-debtor possesses only the power to use. Hence, the
consignee-debtor does not have the requisite quantum of rights
in a sale on approval consignment, but does in a sale or return
consignment.
G. Agency
An agency relationship is created when one party agrees to
act for another. '37 The agent is generally the actor,138 and the
principal is the one for whom the agent acts.'39 Since the agent
would be in possession of the principal's goods, the agent-
debtor's relationship to the goods is the focal point in ascertain-
ing whether the agent-debtor has the requisite quantum of
rights.
In Poteet v. Winter Garden Production Credit Associa-
tion,'4" an agent bought goods in which a secured party of
the agent-debtor claimed a security interest. The principal,
who had paid the agent for the goods, argued that the alleged
secured party had no security interest in the goods because the
agent-debtor never had any rights in the collateral. The court
found no proof that the goods were bought for the principal
since they were bought in the name of the agent. The court,
therefore, held that the agent-debtor did have the requisite
quantum of rights to permit the security interest to attach."'
In National Livestock Credit Corp. v. First State Bank,'42 an
agent bought goods in which a secured party of the agent-
debtor again claimed a security interest. The principal, who
137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (1957).
138. Id. at § 1(3).
139. Id. at § 1(2).
140. 546 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977).
141. Id. at 652.
142. 11 UCC Rep. Serv. 661 (Okla. Ct. App. 1972). The editor's note in the report-
ing service states that by direction of the Oklahoma Supreme Court this opinion should




had paid the agent for the goods, also argued that the alleged
secured party had no security interest in the goods because the
agent-debtor never had any rights in the collateral. The court
found that the goods were sold to the agent for the account of
the principal, which was indicated by the document of title.1 3
The court, therefore, held that the agent-debtor never had any
rights in the collateral under section 9-203(1)(c), and the secu-
rity interest could not attach."4
An agent-debtor's relationship to the goods determines
whether the agent-debtor has the requisite quantum of rights
under section 9-203(1)(c). The agent-debtor who buys for the
account of his principal does not obtain the requisite quantum
because his principal is considered the buyer. The agent-debtor
who buys for himself with the intent to transfer to his principal,
does have the requisite quantum because when he himself is
the buyer,'45 he obtains the essential right - the power to
transfer good title.
To conclude, the key to resolving whether the debtor has
satisfied the quantum element of section 9-203(1)(c) is to ex-
amine the debtor's relationship to the collateral. The necessary
amount of rights is apparent after analyzing the case law and
various relevant sections of the Code. All the relationships
studied, with the sole exception of consent, indicate that the
common thread necessary to satisfy the quantum requirement
is possession of the power to transfer good title to the collateral.
A debtor, therefore, has satisfied the quantum element of sec-
tion 9-203(1)(c) if he has the power to transfer good title to the
collateral.
II. THE POSSESSION ELEMENT
Once the debtor has satisfied the quantum element of sec-
tion 9-203(1)(c), the possession element must be considered.
The possession element is most often confronted where the
debtor is a buyer of goods that will be used as collateral. At
issue is whether a debtor must possess the collateral as well as
satisfy the quantum element in order to have "rights in the
collateral." It is this writer's opinion that possession' 41 is the
143. Id. at 664.
144. Id.
145. See text accompanying footnotes 26 through 36, supra.
146. Possession is not defined in the Code. The meaning of possession under the
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second required element entitling the debtor to rights in the
collateral.
The theory supporting the counter-proposition that a
debtor does not need to possess the collateral to have rights in
the collateral under section 9-203(1)(c) stems from Article 2.147
The theory is that Article 2 provides various rights to the
buyer-debtor prior to obtaining possession, and such rights
Code is a study unto itself, but is naturally critical to determine when the debtor gets
rights in the collateral. For cases supporting the possession theory, see In re King-
Porter Co. v. Scanlon, 446 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1971); In re Dennis Mitchell Indus., Inc.,
419 F.2d 349 (3rd Cir. 1969); In re Page, 6 UCC Rep. Serv. 250 (W.D. Ky. 1968); In re
Ten Brock, 4 UCC Rep. Serv. 712 (W.D. Mich. 1966); Young v. Golden State Bank,
560 P.2d 855 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977); National Inv. Trust v. First Nat'l Bank, 88 N.M.
514, 543 P.2d 482 (1975); Guy Martin Buick, Inc: v. Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank, 184
Colo. 166, 519 P.2d 354 (1974); Galleon Indus., Inc. v. Lewyn Mach. Co., 50 Ala. App.
334, 279 So. 2d 137 (1973); First Nat'l Bank v. Smoker, 153 Ind. App. 71, 286 N.E.2d
203 (1972); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. McElmurray, 120 Ga. 134, 169 S.E.2d 720
(1969); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Smithloff, 119 Ga. App. 284, 167 S.E.2d 190
(1969); Evans Prods. Co. v. Jorgenson, 245 Or. 362, 421 P.2d 978 (1966).
147. Professor Gilmore has the following comment:
The Article does not specify the quantum of "rights" which a debtor must
have in collateral to support a security interest: evidently less than full "legal
title" will do and the secured party will get whatever rights the debtor had (or
possibly, if the collateral is negotiable or the debtor has power to convey title
to a good faith purchaser, more rights). Under the Sales Article of the Code, for
example (0 2-501), buyer gets what is described as a "special property interest"
in goods as soon as they have been "identified" to a contract of sale. This
"special property interest" would seem to qualify as "rights in the collateral"
under § 9-204, so that a secured party who was financing the buyer's inventory
could date the attachment of his security interest from the time of identification
rather than from the time of shipment or delivery.
G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 353 (1965) (footnotes omitted).
In In re Pelletier, 5 UCC Rep. Serv. 327 (D.Me. 1968), the court made the following
observation:
We must look to the provisions of Article 2 governing sales for guidelines as
to when the debtor acquired rights in this mobile home. It is clear that the
debtor acquired a special property and an insurable interest in the mobile home
when the contract of sale was made. See 11 MRSA § 2-501(1)(a). The debtor,
upon tender of the unpaid balance of the purchase price, would also have been
entitled to recover the mobile home in the event of the insolvency of the seller.
See 11 MRSA § 2-502. Moreover, under certain circumstances the debtor could
have recovered the goods, obtained specific performance, or replevied the mobile
home. See 11 MRSA 99 2-711(2)(a)(b) and 2-716. The debtor would have had a
right of action against a third party for injury to the mobile home. 11 MRSA §
2-722. These rights in the collateral, it would seem, existed in the debtor prior
to delivery of the mobile home.
Id. at 337. See also In re Automated Book Bindery Servs., Inc., 471 F.2d 546 (4th Cir.
1972); Douglas-Guardian Warehouse Corp. v. Esslair, 10 UCC Rep. Serv. 176 (W.D.
Mich. 1971); Engelsma v. Superior Prods. Mfg. Co., 298 Minn. 77, 212 N.W.2d 884
(1973); Stanley v. Fabricators, Inc., 459 P.2d 467 (Alas. 1969).
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should be sufficient to qualify as rights in the collateral under
section 9-203(1) (c).1 For example, goods must be both existing
and identified before any interest in them can pass.'49 In the
absence of explicit agreement, identification 5 ' occurs when the
contract is made if it is for the sale of goods already existing,
or in the case of future goods, when the goods are shipped,
marked or otherwise designated by the seller as belonging to
the buyer.' 51 Identification thus occurs before the buyer-debtor
obtains possession of the goods.'5 2 The buyer-debtor obtains a
special property interest in the goods upon identification.'53
Assuming the special property interest would be sufficient to
constitute rights in the collateral under section 9-203(1) (c), 14
the buyer-debtor would, therefore, obtain rights in the collat-
eral upon the formation of the contract for the sale of existing
goods.'55 The problem with this theory is that the special prop-
erty interest is not necessary: the buyer already has a sufficient
quantum of rights by virtue of having the power to transfer
good title."' It is not the lack of quantum of rights that is fatal
to the theory; rather it is the buyer's lack of possession. An
examination of the nonpossessing buyer's rights indicates the
importance of the debtor's possession of the collateral for vest-
148. Douglas-Guardian Warehouse Corp. v. Esslair, 10 UIC Rep. Serv. 176 (W.D.
Mich. 1971); Engelsma v. Superior Prods. Mfg. Co., 298 Minn. 77, 212 N.W.2d 884
(1973); Stanley v. Fabricators, Inc., 459 P.2d 467 (Alas. 1969).
149. U.C.C. § 2-105(2). U.C.C. § 2-501, comment 4, provides some insight into the
state the goods must be in for identification to occur, by stating that
in view of the limited function of identification there is no requirement in this
section that the goods be in deliverable state or that all of the seller's duties
with respect to the processing of the goods be completed in order that identifica-
tion occur.
150. U.C.C. § 2-501(1).
151. U.C.C. § 2-105(2).
152. Identification cannot occur any later than the moment the buyer-debtor ob-
tains possession of the goods. See First Nat'l Bank v. Smoker, 153 Ind. App. 71, 286
N.E.2d 203 (1972).
153. U.C.C. § 2-501(1), comment 3, which provides:
The "special property" of the buyer in goods identified to the contract is
excluded from the definition of "security interest"; its incidents are defined in
provisions of this Article such as those on the rights of the seller's creditors, on
good faith purchase, on the buyer's right to goods on the seller's insolvency, and
on the buyer's right to specific performance or replevin.
154. This assumption is not necessary because the buyer already has the power to
transfer good title and the special property interest adds nothing.
155. For future goods, the buyer-debtor would obtain rights in the collateral upon
the seller's shipping, marking or otherwise designating the goods for the buyer.
156. See text accompanying footnotes 26 through 35, supra.
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ing the debtor with rights in the collateral.
Article 2 provides a predelivery right of recovery for a buyer.
A buyer who has paid part or all of the price of goods in which
he has a special property interest may, on making a tender of
any unpaid portion of their price, recover them from the seller
if the seller becomes insolvent 5 ' within ten days after receipt
of the first installment on their price.' 8 Thus, the prepaying
buyer has the right to recover the goods from the seller while
they are in the seller's possession. The question, then, is
whether the buyer-debtor's right to recover the goods also pre-
vails over the seller's creditors?
The rights of the seller's unsecured creditors in the goods
identified to the contract are subject to the buyer's right to
recover.'59 In other words, the buyer can recover the goods as
against unsecured creditors of the seller. On the other hand, the
rights of the seller's secured creditors in the goods identified to
the contract are not subject to the buyer's right to recover. The
buyer cannot recover the goods as against the secured creditors
of the seller.6 0 Even if the buyer and seller entered into a con-
tract for the sale of the goods before the seller created a security
interest in the goods in favor of a secured party, the secured
party of the seller would still have priority over the buyer's
right to recover.'"' As long as the seller has this ability to create
security interests superior to the buyer's right to recover, the
buyer does not have rights in the collateral sufficient to create
security interests. A buyer will, however, be able to create secu-
rity interests when his rights in the collateral are superior to
those of the seller and any secured parties of the seller.
A buyer can acquire these superior rights by attaining the
status of a buyer in the ordinary course of business.' 2 This
status allows a buyer to take goods free of a security interest
created by the seller even though the security interest is per-
fected and the buyer knows of its existence.'63 The buyer-
157. U.C.C. § 1-201(22).
158. U.C.C. § 2-502(1).
159. U.C.C. § 2-402(1).
160. Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc., 59 Wis. 2d 219, 208 N.W.2d 97 (1973).
161. U.C.C. § 2-402(3)(a) provides that nothing in Article 2 (Buyer's right to re-
cover) shall be deemed to impair the rights of creditors of the seller. In addition, the
reverse of U.C.C. § 2-402(1) suggests that the buyer's right to recover goods is subject
to the secured creditor's claims.
162. U.C.C. § 1-201(9).
163. U.C.C. § 9-307(1).
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debtor, therefore, prevails over the secured parties of the seller.
In Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc.,"6 4 a buyer contracted
with a seller to buy three machines to be custom-built by the
seller. The buyer made substantial payments before delivery as
required by the contract. Upon the seller's insolvency, a dis-
pute arose between the prepaying buyer and a secured party of
the seller's regarding priority to the machines. At the time of
the dispute, one of the machines was in a deliverable state
while the other two were only partially assembled. The prepay-
ing buyer claimed that it became a buyer in the ordinary course
of business at the time of contracting. The secured party
claimed a bona fide transfer' 5 was necessary for the buyer to
achieve that status. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held the
buyer did not qualify as a buyer in the ordinary course of busi-
ness.'6 The court reasoned that the status of a buyer in the
ordinary course of business must be determined as of the time
the buyer actually takes possession of the goods. '67 In this case
164. 59 Wis. 2d 219, 208 N.W.2d 97 (1973).
165. The prepaying buyer had obtained possession of the equipment through a
replevin action. The secured party claimed that possession secured though replevin
was not proper. See also Evans Prods. Co. v. Jorgenson, 245 Or. 362, 421 P.2d 978
(1966), where the court held a buyer not to be a buyer in the ordinary course because
he did not take in the ordinary course.
166. 59 Wis. 2d at 241, 208 N.W.2d at 108. A prepaying buyer's only right to the
goods is through U.C.C. § 2-502(1), the buyer's right to recover. The prepaying buyer's
right to recover, however, is subordinate to the claims of secured parties of the seller.
Id. at 239-40, 208 N.W.2d at 106. The prepaying buyer thus looks to U.C.C. § 9-307(1)
to cut off the rights of the seller's secured parties. But, there is another way to protect
the prepaying buyer. The prepaying buyer should structure the transaction so as to
qualify as a financing buyer. A financing buyer would be one who provides value or
makes advances to enable the seller to acquire the components to satisfy the financing
buyer's order. The financing buyer could then claim a purchase money security interest
in the components and the finished product under U.C.C. § 9-107(b). The only caveat
in obtaining such a purchase money security interest is to be careful to trace the
advances made to the seller to the purchase of the component parts for assembly of
the good. Once the purchase money security interest is obtained, it is a simple matter
to perfect it by filing. The financing buyer's priority would be assured under U.C.C. §
9-312(3) since the component parts will be inventory in the hands of the seller. If the
financing buyer merges his prior right to the collateral based on his perfected purchase
money security interest with his rights as a buyer in the ordinary course upon receiving
possession, the financing buyer will always defeat secured creditorsof the seller.
167. 59 Wis. 2d at 241, 208 N.W.2d at 107. But, the court also had the following
language in its opinion: "It seems clear that, if there is a sale and the buyer has
obtained title to the goods, his status as a buyer in ordinary course will not be defeated
merely because he has not taken possession." Id. at 239, 208 N.W.2d at 107.
Also, on the issue of whether possession is necessary to become a buyer in the
ordinary course of business, see International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Fin.
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the buyer had not taken possession, and therefore was not a
buyer in the ordinary course of business.
Thus, a buyer in the ordinary course of business has supe-
rior rights to the goods as against any secured parties of the
seller. A buyer achieves this status by properly possessing the
collateral. Possession, then, is a requisite element for a buyer-
debtor to obtain rights in the collateral.
Additional predelivery rights of the buyer include the right
to specific performance '68 and the right to replevin.'69 Specific
performance may be decreed where the goods are unique or in
other proper circumstances.' ° The buyer has a right of replevin
for goods identified to the contract if after reasonable effort he
is unable to effect cover."' The buyer-debtor's rights to replevin
and specific performance, howeve, are subject to the same
Servs. Co., 133 Ga. App. 488, 211 S.E.2d 430 (1974). In Associates, a buyer agreed to
buy two trucks from a dealer whose inventory was financed by a secured party. The
buyer paid for the trucks, but never took physical possession of them from the dealer.
The dealer and buyer agreed to deliver the trucks to the dealer so that dealer could
store them until buyer could pick them up. Dealer became insolvent while possessing
the trucks and the secured party claimed priority to the trucks. The court held that
the buyer did qualify as a buyer in the ordinary course of business notwithstanding
that the buyer never received possession of the trucks. The court reasoned that title
passed to buyer and that was the critical factor.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Adamatic felt that possession was a critical factor
for a buyer in the ordinary course because they placed great reliance upon "apparent
or ostensible ownership." They reasoned that "people should be able to deal with a
debtor upon the assumption that all property in his possession is unencumbered,
unless the contrary is indicated by their own knowledge or by public records." 59 Wis.
2d at 240-41, 208 N.W.2d at 107.
Associates obviously runs contrary to the policy basis upon which Adamatic was
decided upon because the debtor in Associates remained in possession of the collateral
upon which third parties usually rely. Associates, however, can be reconciled with
Adamatic.
First, there was no reliance by the secured party in Associates on the collateral in
the possession of the debtor. In fact, the secured party had marked the trucks "sold"
on their inventory listing sheets.
Second, it is possible to argue "constructive possession" had been accomplished by
the buyer. The buyer and dealer did agree that the dealer would store the trucks for
the buyer. This would convert the dealer into a bailee.
The question still remains largely unsolved. Compare Smith, Title and the Right
to Possession Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 B.C. INDus. & COM. L. REv.
39, 61 (1968) (possession necessary), with Skilton, Buyer in the Ordinary Course of
Business Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 1, 20
(possession not necessary).
168. U.C.C. §§ 2-716(1) and (2).
169. U.C.C. § 2-716(3).
170. U.C.C. § 2-716(1).
171. U.C.C. § 2-716(3).
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deficiency as the buyer's right to recover. They are subordinate
to those of any secured parties of the seller. Until the buyer-
debtor's rights are no longer subordinate to the rights of se-
cured parties of the seller, the buyer-debtor will not have rights
in the collateral under section 9-203(1)(c). Furthermore, the
court in Adamatic specifically stated that the right of replevin
alone cannot in any way affect the rights of a prior secured
creditor.'7 2
There are additional statutory arguments which support
the theory that the debtor must satisfy the possession element
to have rights in the collateral. The voidable title-buyer who
has the power to transfer good title7' must be involved in a
transaction of purchase.'74 A transaction of purchase includes
the creation of a security interest.'75 The voidable title-buyer
has the power to create a security interest when the goods have
been delivered.'76 Therefore, possession of the collateral is nec-
essary for the voidable title-debtor to have rights in the collat-
eral.
The consignee-debtor under a sale or return consignment
has the power to transfer good title, 77 thereby satisfying the
quantum element. The goods held by the consignee-debtor
under a sale or return consignment are subject to creditor's
claims while in the consignee-debtor's possession.' 8 The
consignee-debtor under a sale on approval has the power only
to use the collateral,"' and does not satisfy the quantum ele-
ment. However, upon acceptance of the goods by the
consignee-debtor under a sale on approval consignment, the
goods become subject to the claims of the consignee-debtor's
creditors.' 0 Since the consignee-debtor under the sale on ap-
172. 59 Wis. 2d at 241, 208 N.W. 2d at 107.
173. U.C.C. § 2-403(1).
174. U.C.C. § 1-201(32).
175. Id.
176. U.C.C. § 2-403(1). Delivery is defined as voluntary transfer of possession in
U.C.C. § 1-201(14). That definition, naturally provides no assistance for the delivery
term as used with reference to goods. For delivery of goods, U.C.C. § 2-503(1) is the
tender of delivery section in Article 2. But, the language in U.C.C. § 2-403(1) "when
the goods have been delivered" is being interpreted literally to mean transfer of posses-
sion. This interpretation of § 2-403(1) is further supported by § 2-403(3) which inter-
prets delivery as transferring of possession. See U.C.C. § 2-403(3).
177. See text accompanying footnotes 124 through 136, supra.
178. U.C.C. § 2-326(2).
179. U.C.C. § 2-326(1).
180. U.C.C. § 2-326(2).
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proval consignment has been using the goods, he will have
possession when he accepts. In addition, when the consignee-
debtor accepts, he satisfies the quantum element by attaining
the full rights of a buyer.
An examination of a seller's remedies on discovery of the
buyer's insolvency indicates that possession is a critical factor
in determining whether the seller or buyer has rights in the
collateral. A seller may stop delivery of goods in the possession
of a carrier or other bailee until receipt of the goods by the
buyer."'8 The seller's right of stoppage is not subordinate to
claims of secured parties of the buyer.' 2 The seller, however,
loses the right of stoppage upon delivery to the buyer. After
delivery, a credit seller may reclaim goods from an insolvent
buyer-debtor upon demand made within ten days. '" The credit
seller's reclamation right, however, is subordinate to claims of
the buyer's secured parties which attached to the goods in the
buyer's possession.'84 Possession thus determines who has
rights in the collateral: the seller has rights in the collateral
while he maintains possession; the buyer has rights in the col-
lateral upon obtaining possession from the seller.
Typically, a secured party possesses a security interest in
the debtor's inventory as collateral. Goods are inventory if they
are held by a person who holds them for sale or lease."' Before
the debtor (seller or lessor) can have rights in the collateral
(inventory), he must possess the collateral."' Therefore, a
debtor cannot have rights in the collateral (inventory) prior to
having possession. Similarly, a secured party may claim a secu-
rity interest in collateral through an after-acquired property
clause."7 In many cases, the after-acquired clause will identify
the category of after-acquired collateral intended to be covered
- equipment, for example. The test to determine in which
181. U.C.C. §§ 2-705(1) and (2).
182. U.C.C. § 2-702(3) provides that the seller's right to reclaim is subject to the
rights of good faith purchasers (secured parties), but no reference is made to the seller's
right of stoppage.
183. U.C.C. § 2-702(2).
184. U.C.C. § 2-702(3).
185. U.C.C. § 9-109(4).
186. First Nat'l Bank v. Smoker, 153 Ind. App. 71, 286 N.E.2d 203 (1972).
187. U.C.C. §§ 9-204(1) and (2). See United States v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank, 505
F.2d 1064 (10th Cir. 1974); Cain v. Country Club Delicatessen, 25 Conn. Supp. 327,




category the collateral falls is the use made of the property.'88
The debtor must possess the property for use before it can be
categorized.'89 Once the collateral is found to be in the debtor's
possession and is categorized, it can be determined whether it
is within the purview of the after-acquired property clause.
Possession would therefore be required before the debtor has
rights in the collateral sufficient to permit the secured parties'
security interest to attach under the after-acquired property
clause.
The proposition that a debtor can acquire rights in the col-
lateral under secton 9-203(1)(c) without first obtaining posses-
sion does not withstand analysis. A buyer-debtor does not have
rights in collateral still in the seller's possession. The seller's
secured creditors have priority to the goods until the buyer-
debtor obtains possession of them. At that point, the buyer
assumes a superior status to the seller's secured creditors and
truly has rights in the collateral. Possession is thus an essential
element in obtaining rights in the collateral.
CONCLUSION
The debtor's creation of a security interest in favor of a
secured party is the foundation on which all Article 9 rights and
remedies rest. While the Code provides meanings for two of the
three requirements for the creation of a security interest, it does
not provide a meaning for the tautology that the debtor has
rights in the collateral. Its meaning, however, can be ascer-
tained by examining its two components - the quantum ele-
ment and the possession element.
The Code does not define the quantum of rights that a
debtor must have to satisfy the quantum element. This quan-
tum can be discerned by analyzing the different relationships
of the debtor to the proposed collateral - that of buyer, lessee,
voidable title holder, bailee, consignee and agent. The debtor
188. U.C.C. § 9-109, comment 2 states that
The classes of goods are mutually exclusive; the same prolerty cannot at the
same time and as to the same person be both equipment and inventory, for
example. In borderline cases - a physician's car or a farmer's jeep which might
be either consumer goods or equipment - the principal use to which the prop-
erty is put should be considered as determinative.
189. This argument is not as compelling as the inventory syllogism because the
possessory requirement is not stated in the Code. In addition, the use to which the
property will be put may be clearly evident before the debtor obtains possession.
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having the power to transfer a good title to the collateral has
the requisite quantum of rights to satisfy the quantum ele-
ment.
Article 2 does not provide a basis for the buyer-debtor to
acquire rights in the collateral without possession. The buyer-
debtor finally acquires rights in the collateral upon obtaining
possession because at that point his rights in the collateral are
superior to those of the seller and any secured parties of the
seller. The possession element, therefore, is an essential coun-
terpart of the quantum element.
A debtor's possession of the collateral alone is not sufficient
to provide the debtor with rights in the collateral. Likewise, a
debtor's possession of the power to transfer good title to the
collateral alone is not sufficient to provide the debtor with
rights in the collateral. However, upon the coalescence of the
debtor's power to transfer good title and his possession of the
collateral, the debtor has rights in the collateral under section
9-203(1)(c) of the Uniform Commercial Code sufficient to cre-
ate a security interest.
1977]

